sources, apparenty resulting from failure to examine old documents or accuately translate foreign documents. The present invmestigation revealed that contemporary dent reconstrucions yield ammonia lethality leves comparable to those in dozens of reports of animal bioassays, after adjustment of concentrations to human equivalent concentrations via U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) procedures. Ammonia levels potentially caus iersibl injury or impairing the ability of exposed people to escape from fiurher exposure or from coincident perils similarly have been biased do dly in contemporary sources. The EPA has identified ammonia as one of 366 extremely hazardous substances subject to commiy right-to-know provisions ofthe Superfund Act and emergency phanning provisions of the Cean Air Act The Clean Air Act defines emergency plnning zones (EPZ) around indul facilities exeing a threshold quantity of ammonia on-site. This study suggests that EPZ areas around ammonia facilities can be reduced, thereby also reducing emergency planning costs which will vary roughly with the EPZ radius squared. Key work air poliutant, ammonia, emer y nning health risk assessment, human health, inhalation, respiratory irritant. Environ Heakh Perspec 107:617-627 (1999).
[Online 23 June 1999] bap:I/eAepne.niebs.ni/.gods/999/107p61 7-627mhtmI In 1984 methyl isocyanate was released from a chemical plant in Bhopal, India. The release reportedly killed thousands of residents and irreversibly injured the eyes and lungs of approximately 20, 000 (1) EPZ, which in turn depends on the square of the radius around the facility deemed necessary to attenuate a worst-case chemical release to specified airborne concentrations, termed acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs).
The AEGLs for each EHS have nothing to do with routinely acceptable exposures. Acceptable community and occupational levels are set by a host of more conservative parameters. Rather, the AEGLs must be established to protect members of the general population in the context of "exposure at high levels but of short duration, usually less than one hour, and only once in a lifetime" (1) . The AEGIs are under development by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on AEGIs. NAC AEGL composition is legislatively defined to assure balance, although NAC AEGL deliberations about ammonia began before the committee reached its full complement. Ammonia was one of the first EHSs to be addressed by NAC AEGL, and is of great concern both to companies and communities (4) :
During the 20th century, humanity has almost quadrupled its numbers. Although many factors have fostered this unprecedented expansion, its continuation during the past generation would not have been at all possible without a widespread-yet generally unappreciated-activity: the synthesis of ammonia.
Three types ofAEGLs are defined by the National Research Council (1): AEGL-1, to protect against nuisance exposure; AEGL-2, to protect against irreversible injury or disability (including impairment of the ability to escape); and AEGL-3, to protect against lethality. Each type of AEGL is quantified via multiple combinations of airborne concentration and exposure duration (5 (Table 1) . These effects include eye irritation (10, 13, (18) (19) (20) , upper airway irritation (10, 13, (18) (19) (20) , lacrimation (10, 13, (18) (19) (20) , altered breathing patterns (10, 19) , minor biochemical changes (13, 21) , and minor blood pressure and pulse rate changes (10, 19 (10, 12, (25) (26) (27) , rats (10, 13, 28) , rabbits (10, 13, 18, 22, 27, 29) , and cats (13, 18, 27, 29 (30) . However, the estimated ammonia concentration range is unhelpfully broad (700-10,000 ppm-v) and exposure durations are unstated.
Fatal exposure: animal studies. Studies of ammonia-induced mortality in animal bioassays are set forth in Table 2 (27, 35, 36) or 30 min (10, 37) . A different lethality benchmark-7,000 ppm-v over 3 hr exposurewas reported in a draft Environment Canada document (13, 38) . Selected reports of human lethality were examined to distinguish between primary research or clinical reports versus secondary reviews. The evolution of reported lethality benchmark values is traced over time in Figure 1 .
Environment Canada (38) . The 1981 draft is out of print, superseded by a July 1984 final report. The 5,000-ppm-v lethality concentration remains. The Environment Canada (38) (40) , ITII (42) , and RTECS (27) .]
Kirk-Othmer (39). (29, 38) ; mouse (26, 33, 38, (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) ; rabbit (29, 38) ; and rat (23, 24, 28, 31, 33, 38, 63, 71, 73, 76, 77 (45)]; and that 2,500-4,500 ppm-v is dangerous for even short exposure (1/2 hr) (44) . This is a secondary source; the source quality is old but acceptable; more recent and better documented sources would be preferable. The phrase "short exposure" associated with lethality can refer to 1/2 hr or 1/2-1 hr, but seems to have been erroneously interpreted as meaning 5-10 min in derivative contemporary sources (Figure 1 ).
Maass (35, 36) . The German words for ammonia are Ammoniak (gas) and Salmiakgeist (solution). Maass (35) primarily introduced principles of biology and toxicology of chemical agents used in warfare.
However, ammonia appears to be unmentioned, and its citation in the RTECS report (27) Table 4 were based on the more modern HGSYSTEM model (Shell Research, Ltd., London) (53) , which better accounts for the initially heavier-thanair density of cryogenic (adiabatically cooled) ammonia. WHAZAN modeling assumptions used by Pederson and Selig (6) in reconstructing the Potchefstroom accident were applied as inputs to HGSYSTEM (53) . Cold, relatively high-density ammonia remains within the breathing zone before equilibrating with ambient outdoor temperature. Consequently, with HGSYSTEM, fatality rates in accident zones correlate with higher ammonia concentrations, and with lower acute toxic potency, of inhaled ammonia.
As Table 4 indicates, the exposure duration in zone 1 was estimated at 448 sec (7.5 min). The time-weighted average exposure over that duration was 58,647 ppm-v (Table  4) , with 60% mortality ( (Tables 4 and 6) .
A spectrum of predicted ammonia concentration-effect benchmarks is calculated in Table 4 outdoor and indoor air might be sufficiently turbulent to overcome the density-driven tendency of ammonia to rise out of the personal breathing zone of occupationally exposed individuals. In contrast, environmentally exposed individuals presumably would be situated outdoors, where ammonia typically would not be confined. The low vapor density of ammonia relative to air may therefore be regarded as a risk-mitigating factor rather than a risk-enhancing factor as compared to a heavier-than-air gas such as chlorine.
Relationship between Concentration and Exposure Duration in Producing Toxic Effect
An approximation in toxicology (sometimes termed Haber's rule) is that the product of the dose and duration of exposure to a particular toxic substance equals a constant value (6, 33) according to the equation: C' (t) = constant, where C is the concentration, t is the exposure duration, and n is unity (= 1).
This rule is approximate for several reasons (33), the explication of which is beyond the scope of this report. However, the rule often may be usefully applied to closely spaced exposure durations such as 5 min versus 1 hr. Thus, a 5-min inhalation exposure to a particular concentration in air might be approximately equivalent to a 1-hr exposure to 1/12th of the 5-min concentration. Alternatively, Ten Berge et al. (33) empirically determined that n = 2 for mice and rats, and suggest that n might = 2 for humans as well. The relationship elucidated above, with the value of n chosen from 1 to 2, may be used to adjust ammonia concentrations over varying exposure durations to the equivalent concentration corresponding to any chosen exposure duration from 5 min to 1 hr (6). This report uses both extremes n -1 and n = 2.
Adoption ofAcceptable Risk Criteria
Risk acceptability is a subjective judgment, and cannot be defined scientifically. However, qualitatively different adverse health effects may be proposed as being acceptable, and selection of an acceptable risk may be made from any of a variety of adverse effects. These effects might range from no adverse health effect, to clinically insignificant effects, to reversible injury, to permanent injury, or to lethality. Ammonia benchmarks may be quantified based on holistic consideration of toxicologic data, including human clinical data, animal bioassay data, and reports of industrial ammonia release accidents. Selected acute toxicology benchmarks for ammonia are summarized in Table 7 . Ideally, all data sources converge on a single value for each toxicologic benchmark parameter to be quantified. However, Table 7 reveals significant disparity. One source of such disparity is revealed in "Results"; that is, a fundamental conflict between contemporary accident reconstruction results versus largely anecdotal data derived from reports of ammonia potency dating back, in some cases, to the years when ammonia competed with mustard gas, chlorine, and other war gases whose primary purpose was to kill enemy soldiers engaged in trench warfare. Potency values reported for lethality in that context have persisted in the contemporary literature, as depicted in Figure  1 . Multiple industrial accident reconstructions point to a lower potency of ammonia than suggested by apparently anecdotal data, and the lower potency suggested by the accident reconstruction data is consistent with animal bioassays using multiple species.
Fatal Exposure Concentration
The National Research Council Committee on Toxicology defines three levels of community emergency exposure levels (CEELs, since renamed AEGLs). AEGL-3 is defined to protect members of the general population, including susceptible but excluding hypersusceptible individuals, against "death or lifethreatening effects.. for example, pulmonary edema, cardiac failure, or cancer" (1). The benchmark for fatal exposure to ammonia may be derived from American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) emergency response planning guidelines (ERPGs), animal bioassay data, human data, and reports of fatal accidents. These sources should produce consistent results but, in the case of ammonia, they do not. They will be synthesized to produce a conservative but realistic estimate of the ammonia lethality concentration for short exposure durations.
AJIA ERPG-3. The AIHA (61) defines ERPG-3 as
[t]he maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
The ERPG-3 value for ammonia is 1,000 ppm-v. According to the AIHA, [t] his level may cause severe eye and nasal irritation [19, 20, 62] ; however, based on animal toxicology data [63,641 lethality would not be expected.
The 1-hr 1,000-ppm-v ERPG-3 is equivalent to a 5-min value of 12,000 ppm-v using Haber's rule or 3,464 ppm-v using Ten Berge's adjustment with n = 2. As indicated in "Results" and in Table 2 , higher values are also sublethal. Indeed, the AIHA's ERPG-3 value is not based on lethality and therefore already incorporates an unquantified safety factor. The actual ammonia lethality level cannot be reconstructed based on the AIHA's documentation, and the ERPG-3 must be rejected as downwardly adjusted and irrelevant. Animal studies. Numerous animal bioassay reports were addressed in "Results" (Table 2 ). They were adjusted to equivalent HECs using parameters for dose conversion among species (7, 8) and EPA methodology (8) . Although the LCLO parameter is more conservative than the LC50 parameter, the dearth of LCLO values resulted in LC50 values that are lower than the LCLO values (Table 2) . Consequently, both parameters will be considered together.
Concentrations of airborne ammonia whose lethality to humans is estimated based on animal bioassay studies produced an arithmetic mean inhalation LCLO 70, 508 ppm-v/20,000 ppm-v = 3.5 (also at 5) min using Ten Berge's adjustment).
Accident reports. The toxicologic findings discussed above and presented in Table  2 are quantitatively complex but qualitatively simple: predictions of ammonia concentrations that would be lethal to humans tend to be significantly lower than lethal concentrations inferred from animal studies. This is true under Haber's rule [C" (t) = constant, with n = 1] or Ten Berge's adjustment with n = 2 (based on data on mice and rats).
Considered alone, the human data are questionable, as explained previously. Considered in the context of the animal data, the human data are further questionable: no obvious basis is evident for the apparently greater sensitivity of humans than animals. This disparity between human lethality values inferred from human data versus animal data motivated reconstruction of the 1973 industrial accident in Potchefstroom, which killed 18 people, as described and tabulated in Tables 4-6 and depicted in Figure 2 . Figure 2 illustrates the effect of increasing peak, 1 min, and 5-min time-weighted average anhydrous ammonia concentrations in air on the human fatality rate. The LC50 values are estimated to be a peak of 560,000 ppm-v, a 1-min mean of 268,832 ppm-v, and a 5-min mean of 83,322 ppm-v. Longer term values were not generated because the air modeling addressed an exposure period of under 10 min.
The Potchefstroom accident reconstruction indicates ammonia lethality levels significantly higher than both the human data and animal bioassay data. However, the accident reconstruction is complicated because the plant contained a control room and other structures that were at least partially endosed. These potential refuges would tend to elevate the apparent resistance of individuals to ammonia. A conservative interpretation of the accident reconstruction, therefore, is appropriate. For example, the 5-min concentration producing 0% mortality (LCO) determined from zone 4, where no fatalities occurred, was 33,737 ppm-v (Table 6 ). This value is consistent with human lethality levels derived from the animal bioassay data, but is still higher than lethality levels inferred from the human data. It is also consistent with the Mulder and Van der Zalm report (47) [20,66,6X] , but serious health effects are unlikely. Rats continuously exposed to 180 ppm for 90 days showed no adverse effects [64] , and humans repeatedly exposed to 100 ppm for six weeks developed only slight eye irritation [661.
The ERPG-2 value does not represent an irreversible injury level, but an eye irritation level-and not the highest tolerable.
Silverman et al. (19) However, AIHA (65) is superseded by AIHA (61), which states that 300-500 ppm-v is a maximum 1-hr exposure, irritating the eyes, nose, and throat. The AIHA (61) does not state that 300-500 ppm-v is the maximum tolerable, nor that the time frame over which its effects might become intolerable is 30 min. The AIHA also does not state that 300-500 ppm-v might render an exposed individual incapable of escape within 30 min. Indeed, the AIHA (61) further states that 1,000 ppm-v represents [t] he maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects....This level may cause severe eye and nasal irritation; however, based on animal toxicology data lethality would not be expected.
In supporting an IDLH value of 300 ppm-v, NIOSH (68) indicates that "AIHA (1971) also reports that 5,000 to 10,000 ppm are reported to be fatal (Mulder and Van der Zalm 1967)." However, Mulder and Van der Zalm (47) do not say this. Indeed, they cite the 5,000-to-10,000-ppm-v lethality range, but primarily for the purpose of refuting it. They indicate that the deceased was exposed to many times 10,000 ppm-v, that he ignored instructions to report to the infirmary for timely medical attention, and that he was able to resume work for 3 hr despite his injuries.
NIOSH (68) also states that "exposures for 30 min to 2,500 to 6,000 ppm are considered dangerous to life (Smyth 1956 ) [69] ." However, Smyth (69) is a secondary source that compiled suggested "hygienic standards for daily inhalation" (emphasis added).
The NIOSH report fails to indicate how the lethality values it cites might be related to its selection of an IDLH. However, one might surmise that NIOSH regards these lethality values as LC50 values, which might be equated to 10 times a preliminary IDLH value (70):
... LC values (after 'adjusting' if necessary to 30 rnin) were divided by a safety factor of 10 to determine a 'preliminary' IDLH for comparison purposes.
Thus, the presumed lethality values of 5,000-10,000 ppm-v would support IDLH values of 500-1,000 ppm-v, and 2,500-6,000 ppm-v would support an IDLH of 250-600 ppm-v. However, the lethality values cited by NIOSH appear to be unreliable based on analyses presented herein.
Potchefstroom accident reconstruction. The irreversible injury concentration may be derived in a manner consistent with derivation of the IDLH value. The IDLH is initially estimated as one-tenth the (animal) LC50 value. Subsequent adjustment may be necessary based on examination of other types of data, such as explosivity limits and the concentrations at which respiration is reduced 50% in mice or rats exposed for 10 min. The mean 5-min LC50 value derived earlier from animal bioassay data is 70,508 ppm-v using the Ten Berge adjustment, which in this case is more conservative than the Haber's rule value (215,390 ppm-v). The 5-min LC50 value derived earlier from the Potchefstroom accident reconstruction is 83,322 ppm-v, but this may represent an upper limit, as discussed previously. Using Fatality rate ameng exposed individuals Figure 2 . Estimated peak, 1-min, and 5-min lethal ammonia concentrations based on fatalities In a 1973
